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STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING IN DUAL PTAB
AND DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDINGS
Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Arti K. Rai & Jay P. Kesan†
The post-grant review proceedings set up at the U.S. Patent and Trademark
Office’s Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB) by the America Invents Act of 2011
have transformed the relationship between Article III patent litigation and the
administrative state. Not surprisingly, such dramatic change has itself yielded
additional litigation possibilities: Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee, a case
addressing divergence between the manner in which the PTAB and Article III
courts construe patent claims, will soon be decided by the U.S. Supreme Court.
Of the three major new PTAB proceedings, two have proven to be popular as
well as controversial: inter partes review and covered business method review. Yet
scholarly analysis of litigant behavior in these proceedings has been limited thus
far to descriptive data summaries or specific policy perspectives on these types of
post-grant challenges, such as their impact on the well-rehearsed patent troll
debate. In this article, we present what is to our knowledge the first comprehensive
empirical and analytical study of how litigants use these inter partes review and
covered business method review proceedings relative to Article III litigation.
A major normative argument for administrative ex post review is that it should
be an efficient, accessible, and accurate substitute for Article III litigation over
patent validity. We assess the substitution hypothesis, using individual patents as
our general unit of analysis as well as investigating patent-petitioner pairs and
similar details in greater depth. Our data indicate that the “standard model” of
explicit substitution—wherein a district court defendant subsequently brings an
administrative challenge to patent validity—occurs for the majority (70%) of
petitioners who bring inter partes review challenges. An important implication of
this effect is that the PTAB should use a claim construction standard that mirrors
that of the district court. With a uniform standard, PTAB claim constructions
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could be used by district courts in any subsequent proceedings, and the benefits of
substituting administrative process for judicial process would thereby be most
fully realized.
Notably, however, standard substitution is not the only use of the PTAB:
particularly in the area of inter partes reviews, we also see a surprising percentage
of cases (about 30%) where the petitioner is not the target of a prior suit on the
same patent. The frequency of these nonstandard petitioners, as well as their
tendency to join the same petitions as an entity that has been sued, varies by
technology. Our data on nonstandard petitioners provide some insight into the
extent to which patent challengers are engaging in collective action to contest the
validity of patents. Depending on the details of how nonstandard petitioning and
collective action are being deployed, this activity could provide a social benefit or
constitute a form of harassment.
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INTRODUCTION

This is the first paper in a multipart project studying the new
post-grant review proceedings set up at the U.S. Patent and
Trademark Office (USPTO) Patent and Trial Appeal Board (PTAB)
by the America Invents Act of 2011 (AIA).1 These new administrative
trial-type proceedings represent a significant change in the
relationship between the system of patent litigation in Article III
courts and the administrative state. One case involving this
relationship, Cuozzo Speed Technologies, LLC v. Lee,2 is already
before the U.S. Supreme Court and others are in the pipeline.
Although PTAB proceedings have proved to be quite popular,
scholarly analysis of litigant behavior has thus far been limited to
descriptive data summaries or specific policy perspectives on postgrant challenges, such as their impact on the well-rehearsed patent
troll debate.3 This Article is the first comprehensive empirical and
analytical study of how litigants use these administrative procedures
relative to Article III litigation. In addition to assessing the behavior
of litigants, we analyze the behavior of both the PTAB and the courts.
Under the AIA, defendants, potential defendants, and third
parties now confront the question of whether and when to challenge
the validity of patents by filing one or more petitions for inter partes
review (IPR) or, if applicable, petitions for covered business method
(CBM) review. IPR petitions are filed against individual patents (and
claims thereof), but multiple petitions against a patent may be filed
by the same or different parties, and a single petition may be filed or
joined by multiple parties. Similarly, CBM petitions are filed against
individual patents and claims that are directed to eligible business
method-related inventions.4
Meanwhile, patent owners still face the question of which patents
to assert, when and where to assert them, and against whom to assert
them. The AIA’s anti-joinder provision for Article III litigation
1. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
2. No. 15-446.
3. E.g., Brian J. Love & Shawn Ambwani, Inter Partes Review: An Early
Look at the Numbers, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 93 (2014).
4. In ongoing work, discussed in summary below, we are looking in detail at
patents that are the subject of more than one petition. We are dividing these
patents into two categories: those that are challenged by the same petitioner
multiple times, and those that are challenged by different petitioners. We are
further subdividing the two categories by claims and grounds.
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arguably increases complexity by substantially reducing owners’
ability to sue multiple defendants in a single case. 5 Thus, patent
owners wishing to sue multiple defendants on a given patent
generally have to sue them individually. More importantly for our
purposes, the rise of the PTAB forces patent owners to factor in the
strong possibility of retaliatory or even preemptive patent validity
challenges at the PTAB. As a result, two complex frameworks of
resolving patent disputes now coexist: ordinary infringement
litigation and declaratory judgment actions in Article III courts,
along with administrative invalidation actions in the PTAB.
Multiple proceedings with many potential parties offer a number
of strategic possibilities. Two examples of ongoing litigation
involving certain highly asserted and highly petitioned patents
provide an illustration of the complexities and the correspondingly
complicated strategic questions. Although these cases are hardly
representative, they do provide clear examples of the multiple,
perhaps even combinatorial, strategic possibilities.
In a set of seven cases filed between July 1 and July 9, 2013, Zond,
a plasma discharge technology developer, asserted a suite of patents
in Massachusetts district court against nine defendants.6 Intel, one
of the defendants, responded by filing IPR petitions on all of the
asserted patents.7 In April 2014, Intel persuaded the Massachusetts
district court to grant a stay of the litigation. 8 Within two months of
the court granting a stay to Intel, all but one of the defendants had
filed IPR petitions on the same claims and the same grounds. 9 All of
the petitioning defendants received stays, and the PTAB joined them
to the Intel petitions. Although Intel ultimately settled, PTAB review
5. 35 U.S.C. § 299. See generally David O. Taylor, Patent Misjoinder, 88
N.Y.U. L. REV. 652 (2013) (discussing rationale for anti-joinder provision).
6. Zond, Inc. v. Gillette Co., No. 1-13-cv-11567 (D. Mass., July 1, 2013); Zond,
LLC v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11577 (D. Mass., July 2, 2013);
Zond, LLC v. Intel Corp., No. 1-13-cv-11570 (D. Mass., July 2, 2013); Zond, Inc. v.
SK Hynix Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11591 (D. Mass., July 3, 2013); Zond, Inc. v. Toshiba
America Elec. Components, Inc., No. 1-13-cv-11581 (D. Mass., July 3, 2013); Zond,
Inc. v. Renesas Elecs. Corp., No. 1-13-cv-11625 (D. Mass., July 8, 2013); Zond, Inc.
v. Fujitsu Ltd., No. 1-13-cv-11634 (D. Mass., July 9, 2013).
7. The 27 inter partes review petitions filed by Intel are listed in Table 1 of
Appendix C.
8. Order Granting Motion to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review, Case No. 113-cv-11570, Paper No. 120 (D. Mass. Apr. 18, 2014).
9. The 90 inter partes review petitions filed by defendants are listed in Table
2 of Appendix C.
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of the challenged patents continues, albeit with a new lead
petitioner.10
In another set of cases, e-Watch sued eleven firms on two digital
signal transmission patents in the Eastern District of Texas.11 A thirdparty firm filed the first PTAB petition related to those patents.12
Subsequently, HTC, a defendant, instituted a petition, and the
institution of the HTC petition triggered other petitions.13
A major normative argument for administrative ex post review is
that it should be an efficient, accessible, and accurate substitute for
Article III litigation over patent validity.14 In this paper, we assess the
substitution hypothesis, using individual patents as our basic unit of
analysis and also investigating patent-petitioner pairs and similar
details in greater depth. Our data indicate that the “standard model”
of substitution—wherein a district court defendant subsequently
brings an administrative challenge to patent validity—is indeed
occurring. The majority (about 70 percent) of petitioners who bring
inter partes review challenges fit the standard model. In fact, our
data indicate that both explicit substitution and potential settlement
in the shadow of an IPR challenge might be occurring. This
substitution effect would suggest that the PTAB should use a claim
10. Joint motions to terminate proceedings, all filed simultaneously on Sept.
12, 2014, settled the Intel-initiated IPR petitions on Zond’s patents. The settlement
agreement between Intel and Zond that governs the termination of all these
proceedings is confidential.
11. e-Watch, Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2-13-cv-01064 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9,
2013); e-Watch, Inc. v. Samsung Elecs. Co., No. 2-13-cv-01062 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9,
2013); e-Watch, Inc. v. Apple Inc., No. 2-13-cv-01061 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); eWatch, Inc. v. HTC Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01063 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 9, 2013); e-Watch
Inc. v. BlackBerry Ltd., No. 2-13-cv-01078 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc.
v. Sharp Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01074 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. ZTE
Corp., No. 2-13-cv-01071 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Sony Corp.,
No. 2-13-cv-01073 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Nokia Corp., No. 213-cv-01075 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Huawei Tech. Co., No. 213-cv-01076 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013); e-Watch Inc. v. Kyocera Commc’ns, Inc.,
No. 2-13-cv-01077 (E.D. Tex., Dec. 10, 2013).
12. Petition for Inter Partes Review by Iron Dome LLC, No. IPR2014-00439
(P.T.A.B. Feb. 18, 2014).
13. The twelve inter partes review petitions filed are listed in Table 3 of
Appendix C.
14. Others (including one of us) have argued that to the extent the procedures
set up by the AIA resemble formal adjudications, they could serve as a vehicle not
simply for error correction but also for legal and policy development. See, e.g., Arti
K. Rai, Patent Validity Across the Executive Branch: Ex Ante Foundations for
Policy Development, 61 DUKE L.J. 1237 (2012); Melissa F. Wasserman, The
Changing Guard of Patent Law: Chevron Deference for the PTO, 54 WM. & MARY
L. REV. 1959 (2013). In this Article, however, we focus on error correction.
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construction standard that mirrors that of district courts. With a
uniform standard, PTAB claim constructions could be used by
district courts in any subsequent proceedings, and the benefits of
substituting administrative process for judicial process would
thereby be most fully realized.
Notably, however, standard substitution is not the only use of the
PTAB: particularly in the area of IPRs, we also see a surprising
percentage of cases (about 30 percent) where the petitioner is not the
target of a prior suit on the same patent. The frequency of these
nonstandard petitioners, as well as their tendency to join the same
petitions as an entity that has been sued, varies by technology. Our
data on nonstandard petitioners thus provide some insight into the
extent patent challengers are engaging in collective action to
challenge patents.
Depending on the details of how nonstandard petitioning and
collective action are being deployed, this activity could provide a
social benefit or constitute a form of harassment. As we discuss in
Part II, many commentators have noted that challenging an invalid
patent, particularly in expensive Article III litigation, represents a
collective action problem. Administrative alternatives may ease the
collective action problem, but they may also provide opportunities
for harassing patent owners.15 As another indicator of potential
harassment and delay, we also look at the frequency of serial
petitioning on a given patent.
Of course, substitution of any sort (as contrasted with
duplication) can occur only if administrative review is accurate and
efficient, and courts generally stay any related Article III litigation
pending administrative review. In the case of declaratory judgment
(DJ) litigation, the AIA both bars a DJ litigant from bringing a
subsequent administrative review and provides for automatic stays
of any subsequent DJ actions.16 So the issue of duplication primarily
arises in the context of infringement litigation brought by the patent
owner. Although a full answer to the duplication issue awaits further

15. E.g., Gregory Dolin, Dubious Patent Reform, 56 B.C. L. REV. 881 (2015);
Jay P. Kesan, Carrots and Sticks to Create a Better Patent System, 17 BERKELEY
TECH L.J. 145, 165 (2002) (discussing the dangers of delay and harassment in postissuance patent office proceedings); Raymond A. Mercado, Ensuring the Integrity
of Administrative Challenges to Patents: Lessons from Reexamination, 14 COLUM.
SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 558 (2013).
16. Perhaps not surprisingly, since patents became available for PTAB review,
DJ actions have fallen both in absolute terms and as a percentage of case filings.
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decision making in cases currently before the PTAB and the courts,
we provide some initial data on the question.
In this Article, Part II discusses the normative arguments for and
against administrative ex post validity review as a substitute for
judicial review. It reviews these arguments as they developed in
earlier incarnations of administrative review and as they developed
in the far more robust AIA proceedings. Part III provides the largescale empirical data we have gathered. It discusses various indicia of
a general substitution effect in the context of particular technologies
and in particular district courts. We also discuss the phenomenon of
nonstandard petitioners and the collective action in which they
sometimes engage. Additionally, Part III presents data regarding
multiple IPR petitions filed against the same patent. Based on these
data, Part III examines agency and court decision-making in the face
of strategic behavior by the parties before them. Part IV discusses our
major findings, suggests directions for further research, and outlines
our ongoing agenda to advance these research goals.
I.

EX POST REVIEW OF PATENT VALIDITY

This Part discusses the normative arguments that have motivated
administrative review of patent validity, particularly as a substitute
for litigation in the federal courts. Against the backdrop of this
normative framing, we then evaluate ex parte and inter partes
reexamination (the latter now defunct) as well as the new ex post
review procedures introduced by the AIA.
A.

MOTIVATIONS FOR (AND CONCERNS REGARDING)
ADMINISTRATIVE REVIEW

The initial patent examination process will inevitably produce
some improper patent grants. To the extent improperly granted
patents impose unnecessary costs and call into question the
credibility of the patent system,17 these improper grants ought to be

17. See generally Mark D. Janis, Rethinking Reexamination: Toward a
Viable Administrative Revocation System for U.S. Patent Law, 11 HARV. J.L. &
TECH. 1, 7–36 (1997) (considering USPTO’s role in patent revocation via
administrative reexamination). For purposes of this article, we need not engage
the robust academic debate over the level of error the initial examination process
should tolerate.
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corrected.18 The importance of error correction remains a dominant
theme in ex post patent review, especially in evaluating the success
of the AIA.19 Perhaps even more important, however, is the recurring
theme of institutional design: the USPTO’s examination errors
should not merely be corrected, but should be corrected outside the
federal courts.
Several interrelated arguments counsel in favor of administrative
review. Most obviously, Article III litigation is quite costly. The
biennial economic survey of the American Intellectual Property Law
Association indicates that even for the lowest-stakes category of
patent lawsuits (in which less than $1 million was at risk), median
litigation costs have risen from $650,000 in 2005 to $700,000 in
2013.20 And for the highest-stakes lawsuits (in which more than $25
million was at risk), median litigation costs rose over the same time
period from $4.5 million to $5.5 million.21
The high cost of litigation would be less problematic if these great
expenditures yielded great accuracy in judicial outcomes. As
standard economic accounts of procedure note, the goal of procedure
is the minimization of litigation costs and error costs.22 But decisions
18. Ex post review as a means for correcting USPTO examination errors has
been a consistent theme in institutional discussions of patent quality. See, e.g., In
re Swanson, 540 F.3d 1368, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (“Congress intended
reexaminations to provide an important ‘quality check’ on patents that would allow
the government to remove defective and erroneously granted patents.”); In re
Recreative Techs. Corp., 83 F.3d 1394, 1396–97 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (“The
reexamination statute’s purpose is to correct errors made by the government . . .
and if need be to remove patents that never should have been granted.”); Patlex
Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 603 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“The legislative history
of the reexamination statute makes clear that its purpose is to cure defects in
administrative agency action with regard to particular patents and to remedy
perceived shortcomings in the system by which patents are issued.”).
19. The degree to which the AIA ex post administrative review procedures are
actually capturing and correcting ex ante examination errors is the focus of related
large-scale empirical research relying on much of the same data as the present
project. See Saurabh Vishnubhakat, David L. Schwartz & Alan C. Marco, What Ex
Post Review Has Revealed About Patents (forthcoming).
20. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 34 (2013)
[hereinafter AIPLA SURVEY 2013].
21. Id.
22. See generally Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Accuracy in the
Determination of Liability, 37 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1994) (modeling the relationship
between the design of legal rules and the likelihood of reaching accurate
outcomes); Louis Kaplow & Steve Shavell, Accuracy in the Assessment of
Damages, 39 J.L. & ECON. 191 (1996) (modeling the relationship between the
design of legal rules and the likelihood of imposing accurate monetary sanctions).
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reached in Article III litigation may not be particularly accurate. 23
Because patent law often uses science-based proxies such as
“ordinary skill in the art” to tackle relevant legal and policy goals, the
subject matter of patent law can be highly complex as a scientific
matter.24 And even if a case is not highly complex as a scientific
matter, the manner in which factual findings interact with law and
policy can be complex.25 With the possible exception of Federal
Circuit judges, judges in the federal courts tend to be generalists who
may not be equipped to tackle complex questions at the intersection
of law, science, and policy.26 Moreover, district courts have to
contend with juries, which may be even less equipped than federal
judges to address complex questions of law and science.27 In

23. E.g., David L. Schwartz, Practice Makes Perfect? An Empirical Study of
Claim Construction Reversal Rates in Patent Cases, 107 MICH. L. REV. 223 (2008)
(finding high reversal rate for district court claim construction). See generally
Anup Malani & Jonathan S. Masur, Raising the Stakes in Patent Cases, 101 GEO.
L.J. 637, 659 (2013) (offering a brief survey of scholarly proposals to improve
judicial accuracy in patent adjudication).
24. For example, a patent may be challenged as being invalid because the
invention that it claims was obvious under 35 U.S.C. § 103 in light of the prior
technical knowledge available to those in the field at the time of invention.
Whether a claimed invention is obvious is a question of law reviewed de novo on
appeal. But the legal determination is based on predicate findings of fact regarding
the prior art and the level of skill in the art. These findings are supposed to be
reviewed deferentially on appeal. See, e.g., In re Kubin, 561 F.3d 1351, 1355 (Fed.
Cir. 2009) (concerning review from PTO patent denial); see also Graham v. John
Deere, 383 U.S. 1, 17 (1966) (explaining factual findings made by district court are
subject to clearly erroneous review). Meanwhile, the USPTO’s factual findings in
granting a patent are presumed correct and must be rebutted by clear and
convincing evidence in the courts. Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 131 S. Ct. 2238
(2011). See generally Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and Policy: A MultiInstitutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1035, 1068–
75 (2003) (discussing the technical complexity often involved in applying patent
law’s fact-based standards).
25. For example, the practical probative value of factual findings toward
obviousness analysis may vary by the inherent unpredictability of the given
technology: whereas mechanical inventions operate in relatively predictable and
well-understood ways, small technical changes may lead to dramatic and
unexpected results in biochemistry. Pfizer, Inc. v. Apotex, Inc., 480 F.3d 1348,
1364 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
26. Peter Lee, Patent Law and the Two Cultures, 120 YALE L.J. 2, 4–6 (2010).
27. See Mark Lemley, Why Do Juries Decide If Patent Are Valid?, 99 VA. L.
REV. 1673, 1705 (2013) (noting that as far back as the 1950s, modern technology
was already “judged too complex for a jury to understand, so it made no sense to
give them the patent questions” where avoidable).
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contrast, administrative patent judges have long been required to be
“persons of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability.”28
Empirical research bears out concerns about the capacity of
judges to resolve patent disputes. The generalist background of most
district judges has led many plaintiffs to seek out specific districts,29
with the natural result being a certain amount of de facto
specialization.30 A few districts see a disproportionate number of
patent cases, and some have reputations as “rocket dockets” for
resolving them quickly.31 Empirical evidence suggests that, among
the subset of judges who preside over patent cases regularly,
increased experience may produce more efficient and accurate case
outcomes.32 Yet this private ordering toward certain districts only
underscores the overall lack of expertise among district court
judges.33 Moreover, some commentators have argued that aggressive
attempts to specialize in patent disputes by judges whose districts are
found outside traditional technology centers lead to overly plaintifffriendly procedures rather than accurate adjudication.34
28. 35 U.S.C. § 6 (requiring that “administrative patent judges shall be persons
of competent legal knowledge and scientific ability”).
29. Commentators have long discussed forum shopping at both the appellate
and district court level. E.g., Scott Atkinson, Alan C. Marco & John H. Turner, The
Economics of a Centralized Judiciary: Uniformity, Forum Shopping, and the
Federal Circuit, 52 J.L. & ECON. 411 (2009) (forum shopping prior to the creation
of the Federal Circuit); Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does
Geographic Choice Affect Innovation?, 79 N.C. L. REV. 889 (2001) (early
discussion of forum shopping at district court level).
30. Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, Judicial Experience and the Efficiency
and Accuracy of Patent Adjudication: An Empirical Analysis of the Case for a
Specialized Patent Trial Court, 24 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 393, 447 (2011) (showing in
Table III that the distribution of how many cases judges hear is highly skewed such
that most judges hear fewer than ten patent cases each whereas roughly the top
fifth of high-volume judges hear over three-fifths of all patent cases).
31. Saurabh Vishnubhakat, Reconceiving the Patent Rocket Docket: An
Empirical Study of Infringement Litigation 1985–2010, 11 J. MARSHALL REV.
INTELL. PROP. L. 58 (2011).
32. Kesan & Ball, supra note 30, at 423–43.
33. This argument is particularly compelling when offered by judges
themselves. See, e.g., Judge James F. Holderman, Judicial Patent Specialization:
A View from the Trial Bench, 2002 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 425, 430–31 (2002);
Judge James F. Holderman & Halley Guren, The Patent Litigation Predicament in
the United States, 2007 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 5–6 (2007); The Hon. Ed
Kinkeade, Point-Counterpoint: Two Judges’ Perspectives on Trial by Jury, 12
TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 497, 498 (2006).
34. See, e.g., J. Jonas Anderson, Court Competition for Patent Cases, 163 U.
PA. L. REV. 631 (2015); Jeanne C. Fromer, Patentography, 85 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1444
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Another reason to favor low-cost administrative review, rather
than high-cost Article III review, is that patent plaintiffs and
defendants have asymmetric incentives. Supreme Court case law
builds into the patent doctrine asymmetric incentives to litigate.
Under the law’s estoppel provisions, a challenger who successfully
invalidates a patent provides a public good—the challenger benefits
not only itself but also all other potential challengers.35 By contrast,
the challenger who loses is uniquely estopped from challenging the
patent again.36
Although the public-good-type incentive may exist in the
administrative context as well37 (and, indeed, exists in both pre-AIA
and post-AIA inter partes proceedings as a consequence of the
congressional decision to implement relatively strong statutory
estoppel provisions), the significantly lower cost of the
administrative proceeding presumably reduces its scale. In other
words, although a challenger may still be reluctant to provide a
public good, a public good that costs a few hundred thousand dollars
is quite different from one that costs several million dollars.
Moreover, the absence of a standing requirement in IPR proceedings
(2010); Daniel Klerman & Greg Reilly, Forum Selling, 88 S. CAL. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2016), http://www.ssrn.com/abstract=2538857 [http://perma.cc/
528U-TJS8].
35. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 350
(1971) (stating a patent invalidity finding creates nonmutual defensive collateral
estoppel, so that a patent that is invalid as against one party is invalid as against
the world); see also Joseph Farrell & Robert P. Merges, Incentives to Challenge
and Defend Patents: Why Litigation Won’t Reliably Fix Patent Office Errors and
Why Administrative Patent Review Might Help, 19 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 943
(2004) (noting that, in addition to public good problem, disincentives to challenge
may be created in certain situations involving oligopolistic competition between
licensee that pay sales-based royalties to the patentee).
36. Interestingly, some practitioners have suggested that the pre-AIA
tendency of so-called patent trolls to sue multiple defendants in one suit might
have facilitated some collective action through informal or formal joint defense
agreements. See Daniel Bream & Lee Cheng, Benefits of a Coordinated Joint
Defense in Patent Cases, LAW360 (Nov. 27, 2012). Whether or not that was the
case, the AIA’s anti-joinder provision may limit this potential nudge towards
collective action. Id.
37. See John R. Thomas, Collusion and Collective Action in the Patent
System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 305 (2001). But see
Stuart M. Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Who’s Afraid of the APA? What the Patent
System Can Learn From Administrative Law, 95 GEO. L.J. 269, 323–27 (2007)
(noting that administrative review that relied on Chevron deference by the courts
rather than estoppel against the patent challenger could substantially reduce
collective action problems).
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creates possibilities for additional entities, including entities that
represent groups of potential defendants in a given industry, to
challenge patents.
For these reasons, a less costly, more expert, and more widely
accessible institution has long been thought desirable. On the other
hand, even advocates of an administrative mechanism have noted
the potential for harassment of patent owners that might arise in
such administrative review.38 Harassment potential exists as the
obvious flip side of access created by low cost and the absence of an
Article III standing requirement.39 Moreover, to the extent that
courts do not believe that administrative review will in fact be
accurate and efficient, and thus do not stay any related Article III
litigation, such review may create costly duplication rather than
efficiency.
B.

OPPOSITION MECHANISMS PRIOR TO THE AIA

In 1980 Congress created a mechanism for USPTO ex parte
reexamination of patent validity,40 and in 1999 Congress created a
mechanism for inter partes reexamination.41 These procedures have
realized their error-correction and efficiency goals to varying degrees
and have interacted in important ways with federal court litigation.
1. Ex Parte Reexamination
As the Federal Circuit recognized in a contemporaneous opinion,
the ex parte reexamination system was an effort to reap
three principal benefits. First, the new procedure could
settle validity disputes more quickly and less expensively

38. E.g., Kesan, supra note 15 (noting the potential for delay and harassment
in patent office proceedings); Jonathan Masur, Patent Inflation, 121 YALE L.J. 470,
522 (2011) (recognizing that “inter partes review could potentially be abused by
parties interested only in delaying and harassing competitors”); Joe Matal, A
Guide to the Legislative History of the America Invents Act: Part II of II, 21 FED.
CIR. B.J. 539, 550 (2012) (noting that the AIA’s own statutory text directs the
USPTO to penalize abuses of administrative validity challenge proceedings “such
as to harass or to cause unnecessary delay or an unnecessary increase in the cost
of the proceeding”).
39. That said, the challenger who loses at the administrative level may have to
meet Article III standing requirements in order to appeal. See Consumer Watchdog
v. Wis. Alumni Research Found., 753 F.3d 1258 (Fed. Cir. 2014).
40. Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015 (1980).
41. American Inventors Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 106-113, 113 Stat. 1501
(1999).

RAI_INITIALFORMAT_04042016 (DO NOT DELETE)

2016]

7/22/2016 3:16 PM

STRATEGIC DECISION MAKING

57

than the often protracted litigation involved in such cases.
Second, the procedure would allow courts to refer patent
validity questions to the expertise of the Patent Office.
Third, reexamination would reinforce investor confidence
in the certainty of patent rights by affording the USPTO a
broader opportunity to review doubtful patents.42

The parameters of this reexamination procedure reflect its twin
goals: to correct those USPTO examination errors that improperly
allowed patents to issue, and to do so more cheaply, accurately, and
accessibly than the federal courts could.
Cost-wise, the USPTO’s ex parte reexamination fee has grown
from $1,500 in the early 1980s43 to $12,000 at present,44 and
attorney costs have risen to approximately $20,000 at the mean and
$15,000 at the median.45 Even today, the expense of ex parte
reexamination tends to be below $35,000—some twentyfold less
costly than the lowest-stakes category of litigation.46 Moreover, when
the USPTO decides to deny a request for ex parte reexamination, the
agency refunds most of the fee to the requester, further lowering the
financial hurdle, and risk, to a patent validity challenge.47 Consistent
with its mandate to correct examination errors, ex parte
reexamination requires a “substantial new question of patentability”
as to one or more of the challenged patent claims, and this standard
may be met by reargument of information that was previously before
the patent examiner.48 Access to reexamination is also unconstrained
by traditional Article III standing requirements. Anyone at any time
may seek reexamination of a patent, including the patent owner and

42. See Patlex Corp. v. Mossinghoff, 758 F.2d 594, 602 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(internal quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added).
43. Revision of Patent Fees, 50 Fed. Reg. 31818-01 (Aug. 6, 1985), codified in
various parts of 37 C.F.R. Part 1.
44. 37 C.F.R. § 1.20(c)(1).
45. See AIPLA SURVEY 2013, supra note 20, at I-112 (tabulating attorney costs
reported for ex parte reexamination); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-136 (2011); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-114 (2009); AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE
ECONOMIC SURVEY I-76 (2007).
46. Janis, supra note 17.
47. See 35 U.S.C. § 303(c); 37 C.F.R. § 1.26(c).
48. 35 U.S.C. § 303(a).
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the USPTO itself,49 and courts narrowly construe agreements not to
challenge patent validity, in favor of access to reexamination.50
However, for all its intended benefits, the reexamination
procedure introduced in 1980 has long been criticized for its ex parte
nature, which excludes any third-party participation beyond filing
the initial request.51 According to the PTO’s statistics,52 29 percent of
the ex parte reexaminations filed between July 1981 and September
2014 were filed by the patent owner itself, presumably as a potential
mechanism for strengthening the patent.53
2. Inter Partes Reexamination
To improve public participation in the administrative review of
patent validity, in 1999 Congress created a new procedure: inter
partes reexamination.54 Designed to coexist with the old ex parte
procedure, inter partes reexamination conferred significant rights
upon third-party requestors to participate in the USPTO’s review of
patent validity. A requestor could comment on every substantive
response by the patent owner to an examiner action and could appeal
the examiner’s decision to the USPTO’s administrative review board.
However, inter partes reexamination also posed significant
barriers. One was a strong estoppel provision, barring the challenger
49. 35 U.S.C. §§ 302, 303(a).
50. See, e.g., Joy Mfg. Co. v. Nat’l Mine Serv. Co., Inc., 810 F.2d 1127 (Fed. Cir.
1987).
51. Janis, supra note 17, at 6 n.12 (citing Shannon M. Casey, The Patent
Reexamination Reform Act of 1994: A New Era of Third Party Participation, 2 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 559 (1995)); Marvin Motsenbocker, Proposal to Change the
Patent Reexamination Statute to Eliminate Unnecessary Litigation, 27 J.
MARSHALL L. REV. 887, 898 (1994); Gregor N. Neff, Patent Reexamination—
Valuable, But Flawed: Recommendations for Change, 68 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK
OFF. SOC’Y 575 (1986).
52. See USPTO, Ex parte Reexamination Filing Data—September 30, 2014,
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexaminationinformation [http://perma.cc/WP77-V8T8].
53. Certain Federal Circuit cases have indicated that patents that survive
reexamination should be viewed even more deferentially by the courts than
ordinary patents. E.g., Gould v. Control Laser Corp., 705 F.2d 1340, 1342 (Fed. Cir.
1983) (explaining that reexamination ought to “facilitate trial of [the reexamined]
issue by providing the district court with the expert view of the PTO (when a claim
survives the reexamination proceeding)”) (emphasis added).
54. See generally Kenneth L. Cage & Lawrence T. Cullen, An Overview of
Inter Partes Reexamination Procedures, 85 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 931
(2003) (explaining the structural details and concerns motivating the 1999 inter
partes reexamination procedures).
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from raising in Article III litigation any issues it raised or could have
raised during the inter partes reexamination.55 Even more
significant was the prolonged duration of reexamination. The
reexaminations themselves took an average of 39.5 months, and then
had to be appealed to the Board of Patent Appeals and
Interferences.56 From its creation in 1999 through 2012, when it was
subsumed under the new administrative review system established
by the AIA, inter partes reexamination was never widely used as a
means for challenging the validity of patents.57
C.

ADMINISTRATIVE OPPOSITION UNDER THE AIA

The America Invents Act of 201158 (AIA), which created four new
procedures for reevaluating the validity of patents, significantly
strengthened the U.S. system for administrative review of patent
validity. One procedure, post-grant review, is just beginning its
operation as it only applies to patents that issue from applications
filed under the AIA’s new first-inventor-to-file regime.59 Another
procedure, supplemental examination, allows patent owners
themselves to provide new information that helps fortify the validity
of their patents.60 Thus far, the opportunity for robust public
participation in challenging pre-existing patents has arisen in the
two remaining procedures: inter partes review (IPR) and the
transitional program for covered business method (CBM) review.

55. 35 U.S.C. § 317(b) (2000); see, e.g., M. Patricia Thayer et al., Examining
Reexamination: Not Yet an Antidote to Litigation, 5 SEDONA CONF. J. 23, 24
(2004) (noting that estoppel makes “inter partes reexamination something of a
double-or-nothing gamble”).
56. This average included some outlier cases, but the median was a lengthy
34.1 months. See Inter Partes Reexamination Filing Data, USPTO, http://www
.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexamination-information
[http://perma.cc/82NT-8L67].
57. From November 29, 1999, through the abolition of inter partes
reexamination effective September 16, 2012, fewer than 2,000 requests were filed,
and in most years the usage of inter partes reexamination represented only a
fraction of ex parte reexamination. See Reexamination Statistics, USPTO,
http://www.uspto.gov/learning-and-resources/statistics/reexaminationinformation [http://perma.cc/82NT-8L67].
58. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, 125 Stat. 284.
59. As of October 31, 2015, only thirteen post-grant review petitions have been
filed in the USPTO. See USPTO, PATENT REVIEW PROCESSING SYSTEM (Oct. 31, 2015)
at 2, http://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/2015-10-31%20PTAB
.pdf [http://perma.cc/V2N8-EJT9].
60. 35 U.S.C. § 257.
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Before turning to the specifics of these proceedings, we note the
AIA’s desire to promote administrative review is probably clearest in
the situation where the petitioner is a prior district court defendant.
In the case of inter partes review, this “standard model” is endorsed,
at least implicitly, by several features we discuss in detail below. One
feature is the requirement that IPR review occur within one year of a
prior district court lawsuit. The congressional decision to include a
strong estoppel provision, and thus potentially set up in the
administrative context the Article III collective action problem for
challengers,61 may also reflect congressional embrace of the standard
model.
In the case of CBM review, Congress embraced the standard
model even more fully. CBM review explicitly requires the petitioner
to be “charged with infringement,” language the PTO has interpreted
as requiring the petitioner to prove standing necessary to bring a
declaratory judgment action in district court.62
That said, in the case of IPRs, the statutory language certainly
does not preclude petitioners that are outside the standard model.
IPR proceedings have no standing requirement, and the AIA also
provides for potential collective action by allowing joinder to existing
petitions.
Thus far, the new AIA proceedings do appear substantially
cheaper than district court litigation. According to the 2015 AIPLA
Economic Survey, the median cost of an IPR through a PTAB hearing
was $275,000 and through appeal was $350,000.63 Although the
AIPLA survey does not differentiate between IPRs based on amount
of money at risk, these figures are substantially lower than the
median cost of district court litigation even for the lowest stakes
cases.64
1. Inter Partes Review
IPR challenges are available to anyone, other than the patent
owner,65 who has not previously sought to invalidate the patent
61. See supra text accompanying notes 37–41.
62. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a) (“Charged with infringement means a real and
substantial controversy regarding infringement of a covered business method
patent exists such that the petitioner would have standing to bring a declaratory
judgment action in Federal court.”).
63. AM. INTELL. PROP. LAW ASS’N, REPORT OF THE ECONOMIC SURVEY 38 (2015).
64. See supra Section I.A.
65. 35 U.S.C. § 311(a).
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through a civil action66 and who has not been sued more than one
year earlier for infringing the patent in question.67 An IPR petition
may not be filed anonymously: the petitioner must disclose all its real
parties in interest.68 For any patent that issued under the old firstto-invent regime, an IPR petitioner may file a challenge
immediately.69
For a patent that issues under the new first-inventor-to-file
regime, an IPR petitioner may file a challenge only after nine months
from the patent’s date of grant or after the termination of any postgrant review that has been instituted as to the patent, whichever is
later.70 An IPR may challenge patent claims only on the grounds that
they fail to satisfy the novelty requirement71 or the nonobviousness
requirement,72 and may only argue on the basis of prior patents or
printed publications.73 To decide that an IPR petition warrants
institution of an IPR proceeding, the USPTO must find a “reasonable
likelihood that the petitioner would prevail with respect to at least
[one] of the claims challenged in the petition.”74
2. Covered Business Method Review
CBM challenges are available only to parties who have previously
been sued for infringing, or charged with infringing, the patent in
question.75 Like IPR petitions, CBM review petitions may not be filed
anonymously—they must disclose real parties in interest.76 Through
rulemaking, the PTO has interpreted the statutory “charged with
infringement” language to mean “a real and substantial controversy
regarding infringement . . . exists such that the petitioner would have

66. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (3) (providing that a counterclaim challenging
the validity of a patent claim in an infringement action is not a civil action).
67. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
68. This disclosure is necessary because the constraints on who can petition
also apply to all legal privies and real parties in interest of the would-be petitioner.
See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (b).
69. 35 U.S.C. § 311(c).
70. Id.
71. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
72. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
73. 35 U.S.C. § 311(b).
74. 35 U.S.C. § 314(a).
75. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(B), 125
Stat. 330 (stating the prior infringement suit may be one that targeted the CBM
petitioner itself or its privies or real parties in interest).
76. See id.
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standing to bring a declaratory judgment action in Federal Court.”77
Congressional creation of a standing requirement in a CBM review
proceeding contrasts with the absence of such a requirement in an
IPR proceeding. In general, to the extent that IPR and CBM review
provisions differ (and we detail other differences below), these
differences may arise because CBM review was inserted into the AIA
relatively late in the day, and the members of Congress most
responsible for the review saw CBM patents as categorically
suspect.78
For any eligible business method patent79 that issued under the
old first-to-invent regime, a CBM petitioner may file a challenge at
any time after the procedure was established on September 16,
2012.80 For an eligible business method patent that issues under the
77. 37 C.F.R. § 42.302(a).
78. Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version of the CBM provision
as part of a floor managers’ amendment on March 1, 2011, were highly suspicious
of all business method patents. In his March 2011 Senate floor testimony, Senator
Schumer described business method patents as “the bane of the patent world” and
castigated the decision the Federal Circuit in State Street Bank to allow such
patents. 157 CONG REC. S1363 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Schumer). Among
many Senators on the Republican side, positions were equally strong. The Senate
Republican Policy Committee’s summary of § 18, introduced into the
Congressional Record by Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately):
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year Supreme Court
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the
patenting of business methods, emphasizing that these
“inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening
years, however, PTO was obliged to issue a large number of
business-method patents, many or possibly all of which are no
longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a relatively cheap
alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and will
reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of
invalid business-method patents.
157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl).
79. The AIA defines an eligible “business method” patent as: “a patent that
claims a method or corresponding apparatus for performing data processing or
other operations used in the practice, administration, or management of a financial
product or service, except that the term does not include patents for technological
inventions.” Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(d)(1), 125
Stat. 331. USPTO regulations further define a “technological invention” based on
“whether the claimed subject matter as a whole recites a technological feature that
is novel and unobvious over the prior art; and solves a technical problem using a
technical solution.” 37 C.F.R. § 42.301(b).
80. CBM challenges became available one year from the enactment of the AIA,
which was signed into law on September 16, 2011. Leahy-Smith America Invents
Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125 Stat. 329.
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new first-inventor-to-file regime, a CBM petitioner may file a
challenge only after nine months from the patent’s date of grant or
after the termination of any post-grant review that has been
instituted as to the patent, whichever is later. 81 A CBM petition may
challenge patent claims on essentially the complete range of
patentability criteria, including subject-matter eligibility,82
novelty,83
nonobviousness,84
utility,85
single
invention,86
enablement,87 written description,88 definiteness,89 and others.90 To
decide that a CBM petition warrants institution of a CBM review, the
USPTO must find that “it is more likely than not that at least [one] of
the claims challenged in the petition is unpatentable,”91 or that “the
petition raises a novel or unsettled legal question that is important to
other patents or patent applications.”92
3. Intersection with the Courts
Both IPR and CBM review proceedings generate estoppel effects,
though not in the same way. The estoppel generated by IPR is quite
strong. An IPR resulting in a final written decision precludes the
petitioner93 from asserting any claim in either the USPTO, the federal
courts, or the International Trade Commission (ITC) that the
petitioner raised, or could have raised, in the IPR proceeding.94

81. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1), 125
Stat. 329 (incorporating into CBM review the same standards that apply to postgrant review proceedings as codified in 35 U.S.C. §§ 321–329).
82. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
83. 35 U.S.C. § 102.
84. 35 U.S.C. § 103.
85. 35 U.S.C. § 101.
86. See 35 U.S.C. § 101 (allowing an inventor or discoverer to “obtain a
patent”) (emphasis added).
87. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
88. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a).
89. 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
90. See 35 U.S.C. § 321(b) (allowing challenges on any invalidity defense
available under 35 U.S.C. § 282(b)(2) and § 282(b)(3), and under 35 U.S.C. § 251).
Additional constraints also apply to novelty- or nonobviousness-based challenges
based on pre-AIA § 102 or § 103. See Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L.
No. 112-29, § 18(a)(1)(C), 125 Stat. 330.
91. 35 U.S.C. § 324(a).
92. 35 U.S.C. § 324(b).
93. The same estoppel effects bind the petitioner’s privies and real parties in
interest.
94. 35 U.S.C. § 315(e).
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By contrast, a CBM review that results in a final written decision
creates full estoppel within the USPTO only—it precludes the
petitioner95 from asserting any claim in the USPTO that the
petitioner raised, or could have raised, in the CBM review
proceeding.96 With respect to the courts, CBM petitioners are not
estopped from invoking those invalidity grounds that they raised at
the USPTO.97
Both IPR and CBM review proceedings trigger automatic stays of
co-pending declaratory judgment litigation. Just as a would-be
petitioner cannot challenge a patent in an IPR if it has previously
challenged that patent in a civil action,98 if a petitioner files such a
civil action after the IPR petition, then that civil action is
automatically stayed.99 The stay may be lifted only if the patent
owner requests it, if the patent owner claims or counterclaims
infringement against the petitioner, or if the petitioner dismisses its
civil action.100 Likewise, if a petitioner files a civil action challenging
the patent after filing a CBM petition on the same patent, then that
civil action must automatically be stayed.101 As with IPR, an
automatic CBM stay may be lifted only if the patent owner requests
it, if the patent owner claims or counterclaims infringement against
the petitioner, or if the petitioner dismisses its civil action.102
Meanwhile, courts still have the discretion to stay existing
infringement litigation brought by a patent owner pending the
outcome of an IPR or CBM review proceeding. For IPRs, where the
AIA does not specify the standard for such stays, prior standards
pertaining to ex parte and inter partes reexamination remain

95. The same estoppel effects bind the petitioner’s privies and real parties in
interest.
96. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(1). In general, the provisions of post-grant review,
which apply to patents filed under the first-inventor-to-file system, also apply to
CBM review, unless Section 18 of the AIA otherwise specifies.
97. 35 U.S.C. § 325(e)(2) generally estops the relitigation in court of
arguments that were raised or could have been raised in the USPTO, but AIA § 18
provides that § 325(e)(2) does not apply to CBM proceedings—meaning that
patent validity challengers are free to raise those arguments again in the courts.
98. See 35 U.S.C. §§ 315(a)(1), (3) and supra text accompanying note 66.
99. 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2).
100. Id.
101. 35 U.S.C. § 325(a)(2).
102. Id.
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valuable, though not conclusive, precedent.103 Drawing on the
reexamination case law, courts continue to consider the familiar
three factors in deciding whether to issue stays: the potential for
prejudice or tactical disadvantage; the timing of the desired stay
relative to that of the administrative proceeding itself; and the
likelihood that resolution of the administrative proceeding may
simplify the pending litigation.104
Notably, the AIA specifies a four-factor test for CBM-related
stays. This four-factor test encompasses three factors courts
previously used in determining contested motions for stay under the
old reexamination system and adds a fourth factor—“whether a stay,
or the denial thereof, would reduce the burden of litigation on the
parties and on the court.”105 Moreover, for purposes of “ensur[ing]
consistent application of established precedent,” the AIA provides
for immediate interlocutory appeal of the district court’s decision
regarding stays.106 It also states the Federal Circuit’s standard of
review on appeal from a district court decision “may be de novo.”107
Using this standard, the Federal Circuit has held that district courts
have limited discretion to deny CBM-related stays when all claims
asserted in litigation are also under CBM review.108
In general, the AIA’s legislative history indicates Congress
wanted both IPRs and CBM reviews to serve as a substitute for
Article III litigation over patent validity. However, for those
defendants who are charged with infringement of a patent that falls
within the “covered business method” designation, the broader
number of grounds available for challenge, less onerous estoppel

103. See Matthew R. Frontz, Staying Litigation Pending Inter Partes Review
and Effects on Patent Litigation, 24 FED. CIR. B.J. 469, 469 (2015) (“The courts
have precedent in reviewing motions to stay litigation pending the reexamination
procedure; however, the newly enacted statutory limitations have made this issue
ripe for judicial review.”).
104. Id. at 473 (citing Universal Elecs., Inc. v. Universal Remote Control, Inc.,
943 F. Supp. 2d 1028, 1030–33 (C.D. Cal. 2013)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 311(b) and
accompanying text.
105. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(1), 125 Stat.
284.
106. Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 18(b)(2), 125 Stat.
331.
107. Id.
108. VirtualAgility Inc. v. Salesforce.com, Inc., 759 F.3d 1307, 1309–10, 1320
(Fed. Cir. 2014).
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provisions, and a codified stay provision likely make CBM review
even more attractive than IPR.
II.

AGENCY OR COURT: STRATEGIC CHOICES

To describe more fully how these doctrinal frameworks operate
in practice, we offer here the largest-scale empirical study to date of
ex post administrative scrutiny of patent validity. Our analysis is
based on a new dataset of all IPR and CBM petitions filed in the
USPTO since the creation of these procedures under the AIA, as well
as data on Article III patent cases filed contemporaneously with IPR
and CBM petitions, and on requests for litigation stays pending the
outcome of administrative challenges to patent validity. Our findings
provide a comprehensive view of ex post administrative review that
assimilates the more localized findings of prior empirical studies. 109
We begin with the individual patent as our basic unit of analysis and
further explore patent-petitioner pairs and other details. Unless
otherwise specified, our time period is from September 16, 2012
through June 30, 2015.
Our analysis can be replicated using data from the
DocketNavigator service, which provides free and low-cost access to
coded metadata about patent cases in the U.S. federal courts as well
as the PTAB.110 Like LexMachina111 and other widely used patent
litigation data services, DocketNavigator obtains its underlying
litigation data from the federal judiciary’s Public Access to Court
Electronic Records (PACER) service,112 which is the principal data
source of many innovation studies.113 Neither PACER nor the
109. E.g., Love & Ambwani, supra note 3.
110. DOCKETNAVIGATOR,
http://home.docketnavigator.com/ourstory
[http://perma.cc/B4AP-SB4M].
111. LEXMACHINA,
https://lexmachina.com/what-we-do/how-it-works
[http://perma.cc/WA5J-UEDV].
112. PACER, http://www.pacer.gov [http://perma.cc/YP39-UJZ3]; see Judy L.
Heier, Researching Patent Litigation Made Easy, RECORDER (May 13, 2013),
http://home.docketnavigator.com/wp-content/uploads/2013/08/The-RecorderArticle.pdf [http://perma.cc/3ERK-XS3T] (stating that DocketNavigator obtains
litigation data from PACER).
113. E.g., John R. Allison, Mark A. Lemley & David L. Schwartz,
Understanding the Realities of Modern Patent Litigation, 92 TEX. L. REV. 1769,
1772 (2014) (identifying Lex Machina, which obtains and cleans original PACER
information, as the data source); Christopher A. Cotropia & Mark A. Lemley,
Copying in Patent Law, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1421, 1440–41 (2009) (identifying PACER
as the data source); Jay P. Kesan & Gwendolyn G. Ball, How Are Patent Cases
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commercial services that rely on it permit researchers to disclose
significant portions of their database. Accordingly, we describe the
DocketNavigator data we used with the understanding that other
researchers can readily access it to replicate our study.114
A.

LITIGANT BEHAVIOR

Like the administrative ex post validity challenge mechanisms
that preceded the AIA, the IPR and CBM review procedures were
established to provide more affordable, more expert, and more
accessible adjudication than litigation. However, what would-be
patent challengers regard as barriers115 to contesting validity, are
safeguards from the perspective of patent owners. We are quite
interested, therefore, in discovering whether and under what
circumstances IPR and CBM reviews are serving as defensive tools
for defendants previously charged in district court with
infringement; as tools for preemptive attacks upon patent owners; as
mechanisms for harassment and abuse; or as a mix of these
functions.
In general, we show that most patents challenged in the PTAB are
also challenged in Article III litigation. However, there is no clear
relationship between the number of times a patent is challenged in
the PTAB and the numbers of times it is asserted in district court.
Additionally, while Chemical patents are disproportionately likely to
be the subject of a PTAB-only challenge, Computers and
Communications (CCM) patents are disproportionately unlikely to
be challenged only in the PTAB.
We also studied behavior at the level of the individual petitioner.
For both CBM reviews and IPRs, the standard substitution model
describes the majority of cases. Notably, however, in the context of
IPRs, the percentage of petitioners who fall outside the standard
model because they have not themselves previously been sued on the
Resolved? An Empirical Examination of the Adjudication and Settlement of
Patent Disputes, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 237, 266 (2006) (identifying PACER as the
data source).
114. See infra Appendix A.
115. Such barriers include, for example, potential estoppel in the federal courts
from initiating an administrative validity challenge in the USPTO. Supra Section
I.C.3. More generally, as discussed in detail in Part II, patent challengers face a
significant collective action problem. See Thomas, supra note 37, at 333 (noting
that third parties to a successful validity challenge “may readily free ride from the
efforts of the former patentee and the opponent, employing the teachings of the
invalidated patent to practice the invention without compensation to anyone”).
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patent in question is surprisingly substantial, on the order of 30
percent. This percentage is particularly high with respect to Drugs
and Medical patents. Also notable is the extent to which petitioners
that have not previously been sued join the same petitions as those
that have been sued. In the case of Drugs and Medical patents, for
example, petitioners that have not previously been defendants
disproportionately appear to be engaged in collective action with
those that are defendants.
1. IPR and CBM Petitions: Descriptive Statistics
a) IPR Petitions
Through the end of June 2015, petitioners have filed 3,157
petitions for inter partes review. As Figure 1 shows,116 these filings
began slowly in September 2012, when the IPR procedure became
available, and have risen from twenty petitions per month to roughly
140 petitions per month.
These petitions have been distributed unevenly across technology
areas. The National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER)
categorizes patents into six different technology areas: (1) Chemical
(excluding Drugs); (2) Computers and Communications (CCM); (3)
Drugs and Medical; (4) Electrical and Electronics; (5) Mechanical;
and (6) Others.117 As Figure 2 shows, IPR petitions disaggregated by
NBER’s six-part category scheme have predominantly challenged
CCM-related patents, which account for just over half (50.4%) of all
IPR petitions. Figure 3 confirms this trend has persisted from the
start, with cumulative filings in CCM-related IPR petitions rising
considerably faster than those in all other technology areas.
Although IPR petitions may challenge patent claims as to either
novelty or nonobviousness, nonobviousness challenges predominate
across all major technology areas. As Figure 4 shows, nearly all IPR
petitions include a nonobviousness challenge, whereas the
proportion of IPR petitions that include a novelty challenge varies
considerably by technology. The preference for including
116. Figures are presented in Appendix B
117. See generally Bronwyn H. Hall, Adam B. Jaffe & Manuel Trajtenberg, The
NBER Patent Citations Data File: Lessons, Insights and Methodological Tools 13
(Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8498, 2001),
http://www.nber.org/patents [http://perma.cc/NY76-VHVV] (articulating and
defining the NBER classification system and its concordance with the U.S. Patent
Classification system).
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nonobviousness as a basis for challenge is not surprising. While a
novelty-based challenge must rest on a single reference, a
nonobviousness-based challenge can presumably take advantage of
the ability of PTAB judges to engage in complex reasoning that
combines multiple references.118
b) CBM Petitions
Compared to IPR petitions, usage of the CBM procedure has been
considerably smaller in scale. Through the end of May 2015,
petitioners have filed 362 petitions for CBM review. As Figure 5
shows, these filings have averaged between ten and fifteen petitions
per month. Moreover, because CBM proceedings are oriented by
definition toward business-method-related technologies such as
information and communications, it is unsurprising that an
overwhelming majority (82.2%) of CBM petitions challenge
Computers and Communications-related patents. Mechanicalrelated patents make up another 15.9% of CBM petitions, and only a
negligible share of CBM petitions fall in any other category. Figure 6
illustrates these trends.
Unlike IPR petitions, CBM petitions may challenge patent claims
on a fuller range of patentability requirements: in addition to novelty
and nonobviousness, subject-matter eligibility, enablement, written
description, and indefiniteness are available grounds. Across this
range of options, however, petitioners have focused their attention
primarily on subject-matter eligibility and nonobviousness. As
Figure 7 shows, 68.6% of CBM petitions challenged the subjectmatter eligibility of the patent in dispute, and 71.1% challenged the
nonobviousness of the patent. Just under half (48.3%) challenged
novelty. By contrast, challenges as to enablement, written
description, and indefiniteness each arose in fewer than 20% of
petitions.
As with IPR petitions, the relative preference for nonobviousness
challenges over novelty challenges in CBM petitions is rational given
the greater availability of combining prior art references in
evaluating nonobviousness. In addition, the strong preference for
118. John Schroeder, First Ever Inter Partes Review Decision Finds Claims
Not Patentable, LEXOLOGY (Nov. 25, 2013), http://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=d699d660-d5da-4953-af0f-a88e3d3152d2 [perma.cc/CW4C-DGK6]
(noting “the general consensus that inter partes review may yield better results
[than juries in district court litigation] when relying on complex invalidity
arguments hinging on a combination of prior art references”).
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subject-matter eligibility challenges is consistent with the
widespread view among critics of business method patents that such
patents are not just narrowly problematic for inadequate disclosure
in the patent specification or lack clarity in the claims—problems that
are more the purview of enablement, written description, and
indefiniteness—but instead are outside the scope of what should be
eligible for patent protection in the first place.119
Beyond these basic PTAB filing trends, we find that a number of
patents have been targets of serial challenges spread across both
multiple petitions and multiple challengers in IPR petitions. Patents
in the Chemical, CCM, and Electrical areas are particularly prone to
multiple petitions. As Figure 8 shows, a majority of patents in each
of these fields were the subject of multiple IPR petitions: 60.6% of
Chemical patents, 50.9% of CCM patents, and 58.4% of Electrical
patents. Figure 9 shows how these serial challenges are distributed
within technology categories, notably that the highest volume of
serial challenges is in the CCM area. We are currently studying the
precise nature of these serial challenges (for example, whether they
are being brought by the same petitioner) to determine whether they
could represent harassment and therefore are problematic from a
119. This view was held by Senators Schumer and Kyl, who proposed a version
of the CBM provision as part of a floor managers’ amendment on March 1, 2011. In
his March 2011 Senate floor testimony, Senator Schumer described business
method patents as “the bane of the patent world” and castigated the decision the
Federal Circuit in State Street Bank to allow such patents. 157 CONG REC. S1363
(March 8, 2011) (statement of Senator Schumer). Among many Senators on the
Republican side, positions were equally strong. The Senate Republican Policy
Committee’s summary of § 18, introduced into the Congressional Record by
Senator Kyl, stated (somewhat inaccurately):
Recent court decisions, culminating in last year Supreme Court
decision in Bilski v. Kappos, have sharply pulled back on the
patenting of business methods, emphasizing that these
“inventions” are too abstract to be patentable. In the intervening
years, however, PTO was obliged to issue a large number of
business-method patents, many or possibly all of which are no
longer valid. The Schumer proceeding offers a relatively cheap
alternative to civil litigation for challenging these patents, and will
reduce the burden on the courts of dealing with the backwash of
invalid business-method patents.
157 CONG. REC. S1367 (Mar. 8, 2011) (statement of Sen. Kyl); see also eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396–97 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring)
(emphasizing the “nature of the patent” as a newly relevant consideration in
enforcement and accusing business method patents in particular of “potential
vagueness and suspect validity”).
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policy perspective. The frequency of serial challenge to a patent may
also be related to the number of defendants against whom the patent
is asserted in court.
We turn next to the general question of the relationship between
patent challenges at the PTAB and patent litigation in the district
courts.
2. Article III Litigation
Contemporaneous with petitions for IPR and CBM review in the
USPTO, patent litigation in the federal courts has continued apace.
To investigate the interaction between these two fora, we collected
data on all 24,162 patent cases filed between September 16, 2011, and
June 30, 2015, in the federal district courts.120
Many of these cases involved multiple patents-in-suit, and we
observed a total of 47,764 patent assertions across these cases, 121 or
an average of 1.98 assertions per patent case. Figure 10 shows the
trend in patent cases over this period rising from 150 case filings per
month in September 2011 to an average of over 500 case filings per
month by June 2015. These petitions have also been distributed
unevenly across technology areas. Figure 11 shows that patent cases
have predominantly involved CCM-related patents, which far
outpace all other technology areas, and that this trend has persisted
from the start, with cumulative filings in CCM-related patent cases
rising considerably faster than in all other technology areas.122
During this time, a total of 14,218 patents were either challenged
in an IPR or CBM petition, asserted in litigation, or both. A subset of
120. We chose September 16, 2011 as our starting date for district court
litigation because it represents the first date on which patents asserted in litigation
could become the subject of a PTAB filing. Consistent with our interest in
examining the interaction between assertion by patent owners and PTAB petitions,
we excluded declaratory judgment actions. In any event, as discussed in the text,
the AIA essentially makes declaratory judgment actions unavailable to those who
file PTAB petitions. See supra Part I.
121. Though the data that we collected include cases where design and plant
patents were asserted (either exclusively or together with utility patents), we focus
our analysis on utility patents.
122. Because district court cases can (and frequently do) involve multiplepatents in a single suit—unlike IPR or CBM petitions, which are necessarily limited
to a single patent—we calculate technology trends by aggregating a technology’s
relative share among the patents that were asserted in each case. For example, a
patent case involving three CCM patents and two Electrical patents would have
been counted as 0.6 of a CCM case and 0.4 of an Electrical case.
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11,787 patents were involved in litigation alone; 324 patents were
involved in a USPTO proceeding alone; and 2,107 patents were
involved in both. Accordingly, about 15.2% of litigated patents are
also being challenged in the PTAB,123 and about 86.7% of IPR- or
CBM-challenged patents are also being litigated in the federal
courts.124
These measures suggest validity challenges in the USPTO are,
indeed, connected with the threat or fact of infringement litigation,
for a large majority of challenged patents are also asserted in court.
Indeed, our measures may understate the connection the connection
between Article III litigation and assertion at the PTAB. According to
Lex Machina analytics, of the patent cases filed in the U.S. district
courts during the time period that we studied, 70.2% were likely
settled. Moreover, three-quarters of those likely settlements
occurred within 9.9 months. This pattern of likely settlement may
have been prompted, at least in part, by a defendant’s threat to file a
challenge at the PTAB. In addition, typically only 10% of patent
lawsuits reach the stage at which they would receive a claim
construction ruling. This 10% figure is in line with our finding that
15.2% of litigated patents are being challenged in the PTAB. It is
worth noting that a patent challenged at the PTAB would receive an
early claim construction at the institution stage in the IPR/CBM
process. That said, we do not imply that the same 10% of patent cases
that reach the claim construction stage in district court are also the
same patents that are the subject of a challenge at the PTAB.
Our data indicate that patents challenged in the PTAB are, on
average, also asserted at least three times in court. As Figure 12
indicates, however, this average reflects considerable variation (as
shown by the error bars representing one standard deviation of the
mean). At least when the group of patents involved in IPR and CBM
proceedings is considered as a whole—that is, without disaggregation
by technology and district court—the relationship between the
number of IPR or CBM petitions that were filed on a patent and the
number of times that the patent was asserted in district court is not
monotonic. Finally, of course, most patents asserted in district court
are not challenged at the PTAB.

123. This is calculated as 2107 / ( 2107 + 11787 ) = 15.2%.
124. This is calculated as 2107 / ( 2107 + 324 ) = 86.7%.
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To further investigate the relationship between PTAB challenges
and Article III assertions, we evaluated a series of measures
constructed from the underlying data.
a) IPR and CBM Reviews with Litigation in the Offing
In light of the intended uses of IPR and CBM review as substitutes
for federal court litigation, notably, in a number of cases, a given
patent was challenged in a PTAB petition before that patent was
asserted in litigation. This is a relatively rare occurrence. As of June
30, 2015, 2107 patents have been the subjects of both a PTAB
challenge (either in IPR or CBM) and of district court litigation. Only
fifty-eight of these patents (2.75%) were challenged in district court
litigation simultaneously with or after the first PTAB challenge,
rather than before.
Their small number notwithstanding, these cases arguably
represent a challenge to the standard model of a PTAB challenge as
a substitute for ongoing litigation. However, a relatively small
variation to that standard model could encompass the case where
litigation was actually imminent. In other words, in these
circumstances the filing of a petition in the PTAB was similar to a
declaratory judgment action. That is, indeed, what we find. Of the
fifty-eight patents that were challenged in the PTAB before any
litigation, forty-seven patents (81.0%) were challenged by petitioners
who were subsequently named as defendants in federal court
litigation over the same patents.
b) IPR and CBM Reviews with No Related Litigation
Another phenomenon that must be reconciled with the standard
model is that some patents are challenged in the PTAB but have not
been observed in litigation at all, either before or after the petition
for IPR or CBM review. Though a PTAB validity challenge is a
reasonable substitute for litigation that has already begun or is
imminent, it may be a potentially counterproductive approach for
anyone else:125 particularly in the case of an IPR (where, as
125. For example, the filing fees for IPR are $9,000 at the petition stage and
$14,000 at the post-institution stage. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(a). The filing fees for CBM
review are even higher: $12,000 at the petition stage and $18,000 at the postinstitution stage. 37 C.F.R. § 42.15(b). Contemporaneous estimates of average
attorney costs were over $130,000. Olga Berson, Challenging Patent Validity
Under the AIA: Strategic and Tactical Considerations When Deciding Whether to
Pursue Ex parte Reexamination or Inter Partes Review As Part of the Overall
Litigation Strategy, 2012 WL 6636452, *12 (2012).
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contrasted with the CBM review, the petitioner does not have to be
charged in any way with infringement), such a challenger might
simply raise unwanted attention to its potentially infringing
activities. Indeed, IPRs or CBM reviews with no related litigation are
a somewhat rare occurrence. As of June 30, 2015, only 324 patents
(13.3% of all patents challenged in the PTAB) have been challenged
in the PTAB with no related litigation observed in the federal courts.
But even the existence of such a subset might be considered peculiar.
There are several potential reasons for this unexpected subset.
One is statistical censoring: the PTAB challenges are simply so recent
that the patent owner has not filed responsive litigation yet, but may
do so in the relatively near term. Censoring, however, does not
appear to explain the subset fully. Petitions on such “PTAB-only”
patents have been filed from the earliest days of IPR and CBM review
in September 2012. Of the 324 patents challenged in the PTAB with
no related litigation, 163 (50.3%) had been challenged in petitions
filed more than one year before June 30, 2015 – that is, in or before
June 2014. In other words, many of the patent owners have had
ample time to bring infringement actions against the petitioners who
filed for IPR or CBM review and have not yet done so. So it is still
possible, but increasingly unlikely, that a patent owner who has not
asserted a patent against an IPR or CBM challenger will do so now.
A second possible reason for this phenomenon is statistical
selection, including technology-specific selection: where a PTAB
validity challenge is sufficiently strong, and a patent owner’s
countervailing infringement claim against the PTAB challenger is
sufficiently weak, an invalidity challenge might arise without any
corresponding infringement assertion. This kind of selection effect,
however, would require that both parties have information ex ante
about the relative merits of each other’s case, i.e., about the
boundaries and legal viability of the patent in dispute, that is both
adequate and roughly symmetric. Such ex ante clarity may be
possible for Chemical and Drugs and Medical patents, where
technical nomenclature is standardized and the boundaries of the
invention are amenable to delineation.126 Ex ante clarity may even be
possible for Electrical and Mechanical patents if the patent discloses
sufficiently detailed structural information. However, patents on
126. Peter S. Menell & Michael J. Meurer, Notice Failure and Notice
Externalities, 5 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 1, 36 (2013). Indeed, in the case of certain drugs
(so-called small molecule drugs), patents asserted to cover the drug are specifically
on the FDA “Orange Book.”
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CCM inventions that are claimed in functional terms would be much
less likely to provide enough ex ante clarity that a PTAB challenge
would be so plainly strong, and a retaliatory infringement suit so
plainly weak, as to produce an IPR or CBM review with no litigation
in response.
Additionally, in at least some technology areas, the number of
patents that are clearly “important” as a matter of potential litigation
risk may be relatively small and easy to identify. Particularly in the
context of IPRs (which can be filed even without any assertion of
infringement on the part of the patentee), the high volume of CCMrelated patents may make it unclear which patents are most
important.
The data are consistent with technology-specific selection effects
across the three subsets of (1) patents that were only challenged in
the PTAB, (2) patents that were only asserted in litigation, and (3)
patents that were both challenged in the PTAB and asserted in
litigation as summarized in Figure 13. Comparing PTAB-only patents
with district court-only patents, the technology distributions were
mostly similar. In both subsets, CCM patents accounted for about a
third (32.8% and 37.1%, respectively); Drugs and Medical patents
about a fifth (20.6% and 19.7%, respectively); Electrical patents a
little less than a seventh (13.9% and 11.3%, respectively); and
Mechanical patents a little more than a tenth (11.5% and 10.1%,
respectively).127 Only Chemical patents occupied a significantly
greater share of PTAB-only patents (12.5%) than of district courtonly patents (4.9%).128
The most notable difference was for patents that were both
challenged in the PTAB and asserted in district court. A majority of
these PTAB-and-district-court patents (54.7%) were in the CCM
technology area, as compared with 32.8% of PTAB-only patents.129
This underrepresentation of CCM patents in the PTAB-only group is
consistent with the expected lower likelihood that CCM patents offer
enough ex ante clarity and evidence of importance to produce PTAB
challenges in situations where there is no federal court litigation.

127. These differences were not statistically significant (p > 0.05 using a twotailed test of proportions).
128. Conversely, “Other” patents occupied a greater share of district court-only
patents (16.9%) than of PTAB-only patents (8.8%).
129. This difference was highly statistically significant (p < 0.0001 using a twotailed test of proportions).
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Having considered the special cases of PTAB validity challenges
that either precede a district court litigation or have no related
litigation at all, we now turn to the standard model of PTAB validity
challenge as a direct response by a defendant in prior infringement
litigation.
c) CBM and IPR Challenges As Direct Self Interest
As we have discussed, a defendant that challenges a patent’s
validity in the USPTO after the patent has been asserted in litigation
is the standard use of CBM and IPR petitions. The USPTO’s expertise
substitutes for the generalist orientation of the courts. We find that,
overall, CBM and IPR petitions are in fact predominantly assertions
of the petitioners’ own direct interests with respect to infringement
liability on the particular patent being challenged.
In the majority of cases, petitioners for CBM review have
previously been defendants in federal court litigation where the same
patent was asserted. Two related measures support this finding. One
is the share of CBM petitioners (77.9%) who have previously been
defendants in district court litigations involving the patents they
later challenge in CBM review. The other is the share of CBM
petitions (82.7%) in which at least one petitioner was previously a
defendant as to the patent now being challenged. These results are
perhaps unsurprising, as CBM petitions can only be brought by those
sued for, or charged with, infringement. Additionally, though it is not
particularly meaningful to speak of technology differences among
CBM petitions,130 Figures 14a and 14b show that the finding also
persists for each NBER technology category.
Similarly, in the case of IPRs, the majority (70%) of IPR
petitioners have previously been defendants in district court
litigations involving the patents they now challenge. The remaining
30% of cases in which petitioners are not prior defendants do,
however, represent an interesting puzzle, particularly if one looks
across technologies, and also at the percentage of petitions in which
at least one petitioner was previously a defendant. We turn next to
this puzzle.

130. This is because the availability of CBM review is defined, and limited, by
technology, and as a result, CCM patents have accounted for 82.2% of all CBM
Petitions, with 15.9% coming from Mechanical patents and 1.9% from Other
patents. See infra Figure 6.
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d) IPR Challenges by Entities That Were Not Prior
Defendants
As Figure 15a shows, the percentage of IPR petitioners who were
not prior defendants varies substantially across technologies.
Notably, because only about 48% of petitioners in the Drugs and
Medical area have previously been sued, over half of all petitioners
in this technology are non-standard. In some cases, generic firms
may be filing even prior to being sued in order to clear the path
toward eventual entry into the market. In other cases, we know from
reading IPR petitions to identify petitioners that third parties have
been active. One active third party is J. Kyle Bass, the principal of
Hayman Capital Management and of the Coalition for Affordable
Drugs, who, as of June 30, 2015, had filed at least twenty-eight
petitions.131 Another is Erich Spangenberg, the chief executive of the
IP Navigation Group and of nXn Partners, who is a co-petitioner on
those twenty-eight petitions.132 Both Mr. Bass and Mr. Spangenberg
have thus far focused their validity challenges entirely on Drugs and
Medical-related patents.
Figures 15a and 15b also reveal substantial disparities in certain
technology areas between the share of petitioners who were
previously sued and the share of IPR petitions with at least one
petitioner who was previously a defendant on the challenged patent.
Specifically, the petitioner vs. petition disparities are quite
substantial in the categories of Drugs and Medical (48.5% vs. 70.8%),
Mechanical (53.1% vs. 70.2%), and Other (65.5% vs. 82.6%). The
disparities reveal that, in each of these technology areas, petitioners
who are not prior defendants are joining petitions filed by prior
defendants.
Arguably, this collective action is socially beneficial, as it directly
addresses the general collective action problem in challenging
invalid patents.133 However, to the extent collective action takes the
form of serial petitions that are joined later to the petition of a prior
131. Joseph Walker & Rob Copeland, New Hedge Fund Strategy: Dispute the
Patent, Short the Stock, WALL ST. J., Apr. 7, 2015, http://www.wsj.com/articles/
hedge-fund-manager-kyle-bass-challenges-jazz-pharmaceuticals-patent1428417408 [http://perma.cc/X26M-53QM].
132. David Segal, Has Patent, Will Sue: An Alert to Corporate America, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/14/business/has-patentwill-sue-an-alert-to-corporate-america.html [http://perma.cc/R2X6-8D49].
133. See supra text accompanying notes 36–38.
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defendant, it could be seen as harassment and delay. Currently, our
data do not allow us to determine exactly when nondefendant
petitioners are joining the petitions of defendants. PTO regulations
do require, however, that a joinder request be filed no later than one
month after the institution date of any inter partes review for which
joinder is requested.134 In ongoing research, we are parsing the
joinder data more finely to look at timing and how the regulations
are being applied.
In this regard, it bears mention that fostering collective action is
the explicit mission of organizations such as Unified Patents, which
files patent validity challenges on behalf of its member companies in
order to reduce their patent litigation risk.135 We expect that, in order
to be effective, such member-based organizations would likely file
significant numbers of IPR petitions and focus their efforts largely
on a single technology area. During the time period of our study,
Unified Patents had, for example, has filed at least twenty-four
petitions of which seventeen (71%) are against CCM-related patents.
e) Timing Between the Courts and the USPTO
Closely related to the “non-standard” petitioner issue is the
question of time lag between Article III assertion and PTAB
challenge. Unless the petition includes a request for joinder, a
petitioner cannot file an IPR challenge more than a year after it has
been sued for infringing a particular patent.136 As a result,
administrative validity challenges filed more than one year after the
last federal court lawsuit prior to a petition are likely to reflect either
non-standard petitioners and/or petitioners seeking joinder to
earlier petitions.
To investigate these issues further, we measured the time lag
between the first IPR petition on a given patent and the federal court
litigation on that patent filed most recently prior to the first IPR
petition. (By definition, the first IPR petition cannot request joinder.)
As an additional frame of reference for these results, we calculated
the lag between the first IPR petition on a given patent and the
earliest observed federal court litigation on that patent. The latter
measure takes a broad view of how court-agency lags are distributed
and is likely to contain a small, but non-trivial, number of instances
134. 37 C.F.R. § 42.122(b).
135. UNIFIED
PATENTS
[http://perma.cc/K4XC-4Y23].
136. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).

INC.,

http://www.unifiedpatents.com/faq
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where the lag is greater than one year. The reason is that, for
repeatedly-asserted patents, the first defendant sued need not be the
one that mounts a validity challenge in the USPTO.
As Figure 17 shows, quite a few patents fit this latter profile:
nearly a quarter of the distribution (23.4%) exceeds the one-year lag
from the earliest observed federal court litigation on a given patent,
reaching upwards of three years for some patents. Notably, a small
share of patents, roughly 3.3%, shows a negative lag indicating the
first IPR petition against the patent preceded the first federal court
assertion of the patent.137 For these patents, administrative validity
challenges are not defensive in the traditional sense, as no offensive
litigation has yet been observed; rather, they are, at most,
preemptive. Most IPR petitions, however, fall within the zero-to-oneyear range, distributed symmetrically about a median lag of six
months, with a modal spike at the one-year deadline.
Meanwhile, measuring from the last pre-IPR federal court
lawsuit to the first IPR petition is likely to capture not only nonstandard petitioners but also cases where earlier lawsuits against
others have revealed useful information about the patent owner’s
enforcement strategy so that less time is needed to decide whether
and how to prepare an IPR challenge. This is, in fact, what the data
reveal in Figure 18. The majority of cases fall again within the zeroto-one-year range, but with a median lag roughly four months less
than in Figure 17. A far smaller share of the distribution (11.4%)
exceeds one year—presumably this 11.4% comprises non-standard
petitioners only. As before, a modal spike near and at a one-year lag
indicates that litigants wait for the statutory deadline.
These direct and indirect measures suggest that challenges to
patent validity through inter partes review are primarily—though not
exclusively—a defensive response to existing litigation. In most cases,
a prior defendant files an administrative challenge. Other entities,
acting on this revealed information, may also respond with petitions
for validity review.
We now turn to another aspect of strategic behavior in patent
litigation that has previously presented policy concerns: the
tendency of patent cases to be filed disproportionately in a few
judicial districts, so much so that these districts are now widely
identified with patent litigation.
137. As we have discussed, these preemptively-challenged patents may reflect
litigation in the offing or else no related litigation. See supra Sections III.A.2.a–b.
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f) District-Specific Effects
Skewed distribution of patent litigation toward particular highvolume judicial districts and litigant forum-shopping, which not only
results from this skew but also contributes to it, are well
documented.138 It is likely, then, that such leading patent courts
should send commensurately greater numbers of patents into PTAB
validity challenges as well. Yet in this regard, the data show a
surprising effect. Of the eight leading district courts—which together
account for nearly 70% of litigated patents during the observed time
period—the top three courts were overrepresented in sending
patents into PTAB validity challenges, and the remaining five were
underrepresented.
Figure 16 depicts the fraction of all litigated patents that were
litigated at least once in a given court and the fraction of all IPRchallenged patents that were litigated at least once in the same court,
across the top eight districts for patent litigation. The latter fraction
was significantly higher than the former for the District of Delaware
(41.1% vs. 34.4%), the Eastern District of Texas (41.4% vs. 28.5%),
and the Northern District of California (21.6% vs. 15.2%),139
indicating that patents litigated in those districts were unusually
likely to be challenged in inter partes review. The effect was reversed
for the other high-volume patent districts, including the Central
District of California (14.1% vs. 16.0%), the District of New Jersey
(10.0% vs. 13.0%), and the Northern District of Illinois (4.8% vs.
9.6%).140
The great disparity we see in the Eastern District of Texas is
unsurprising—the court’s strong pro-patentee reputation141 would be
expected to drive defendants to a more strategically favorable forum.
This effect is likely in spite of the apparently low likelihood of
defendants either filing or being granted stays in the Eastern District
of Texas.142 In the cases of the District of Delaware and the Northern
138. See generally notes 29–34 and accompanying text.
139. These differences were highly significant (p < 0.0001 using a two-tailed
test of proportions).
140. These differences were all significant as well (p < 0.05 using a two-tailed
test of proportions).
141. See, e.g., Vishnubhakat, supra note 31, at 65 (discussing the reputation of
the Eastern District of Texas for producing pro-patentee outcomes).
142. PTAB Stay Stats: 2012 to May 31, 2015, WINSTON & STRAWN LLP,
http://www.winston.com/en/thought-leadership/winston-publishes-stats-on-ptabstays.html [https://perma.cc/3W7H-Y3Q4].
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District of California, the reasons for disproportionately high IPR
filings are less clear. Defendants may be encouraged, however, by the
high rate of stay grants in these districts.143
B.

AGENCY DECISIONS

When petitioned, the PTAB must decide whether to institute an
IPR or CBM review on the grounds petitioned. If it decides to
institute a review, the PTAB must then adjudicate the case on its
merits. Decisions on institution and on the merits are
interdependent in that the legal standard for instituting an IPR is
whether the petitioner is reasonably likely to succeed as to at least
one claim, and the legal standard for instituting a CBM review is
whether the petitioner is more likely than not to prevail as to at least
one claim.144 Therefore, the rates of institution are particularly
important because the very fact of institution is, by statutory design,
a credible signal about the ultimate outcome of the validity challenge.
In the case of IPR, an early study that examined petitions filed as
of March 31, 2014 found that, of those petitions that had reached an
institution decision by the time of the authors’ analysis in late 2014,
84.0% had been granted as to at least one challenged claim.145 Our
analysis, which runs through June 30, 2015, confirms this point
estimate but reveals a slow and consistent decline in the institution
rate. Figure 19 compares over time (1) the running total number of
IPR petition filings, (2) the running total number of institution
decisions, and (3) the running total number of institution decisions
granting at least one challenged claim. Calculating the institution
rate as (3) divided by (2) over time, Figure 20 shows that the rate has
been declining and is currently 74.8%.
The earlier study also found that 74.0% of at-least-partially
instituted petitions were fully instituted. Our data conflict on this
point. We find that 41.2% of at-least-partially instituted decisions
made on petitions filed by March 31, 2014 were fully instituted.146 As
143. Id.
144. See 35 U.S.C. § 324(b), supra note 91; LEXMACHINA, supra note 110, and
accompanying text.
145. Love & Ambwani, supra note 3, at 100.
146. With respect to petitions filed by March 31, 2014, we observed 851 IPR
institution decisions (roughly similar to the 823 in the earlier study) and 699
decisions granting at-least-partial institution (roughly similar to the 691 in the
earlier study). These small discrepancies may arise in part because we had the
benefit of observing PTAB actions on petitions over a longer time horizon.
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of June 30, 2015, 51.4% of at-least-partially instituted petitions were
fully instituted, and 38.4% of petitions that received an institution
decision were fully instituted. These trends are summarized in Figure
21.
In addition to general institution rates, we also disaggregate
institution rates by technology area and by the grounds on which
patent validity was challenged. Figure 22 shows the rates at which
institutions are granted and denied across technologies for petitions
arguing a lack of novelty. Petitions on Drugs and Medical-related
patents have a 59.9% likelihood of being denied,147 and in all other
technologies, petitions are as likely as not to be instituted (p > 0.05).
Figure 23 shows the rates at which institutions are granted and
denied across technologies for petitions arguing a lack of
nonobviousness. Perhaps not surprisingly, given the ability of expert
judges to combine multiple references, nonobviousness petitions are
more likely than not to be instituted across all technology areas.
Nonobviousness challenges to Chemical patents are particularly
likely to be granted, with an institution rate of 68.5%.148
Meanwhile, for CBM petitions, comparing technology categories
is not particularly meaningful, as the definition of covered business
method patents in practice overlaps substantially with CCM-related
patents. Instead, because CBM review allows the full range of legal
grounds on which to challenge validity149 and because petitioners
themselves have availed themselves of these grounds to varying
degrees,150 comparing the rates at which CBM petitions have been
instituted with respect to each of these grounds is more meaningful.
Figure 7 previously showed that subject-matter eligibility under
§ 101, novelty under § 102, and nonobviousness under § 103 were the
major grounds on which CBM petitions have been filed whereas the
enablement, written description, and definiteness requirements of
§ 112 have been employed relatively infrequently. Because CBM
review arose out of categorical resistance to business methods as
Truncation does not, however, explain our disparate findings on rates of full
institution.
147. The differences between respective likelihoods of grant and denial are
highly significant (p < 0.001 using a two-tailed test of proportions).
148. The differences between respective likelihoods of grant and denial are
significant (p < 0.05) for Mechanical-related petitions, and highly significant for all
other technologies (p < 0.005). Comparisons use a two-tailed test of proportions.
149. See 35 U.S.C. § 315(a)(2); Frontz, supra note 103; supra note 108.
150. See infra Figure 7.
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patent-eligible subject matter, and inception of CBM review
coincided with Supreme Court decisions substantially strengthening
patent eligibility requirements, we expected that subject-matter
challenges would be the most fertile ground for decisions to institute
CBM petitions. We expected that the remaining grounds would be
likely to garner fewer PTAB institutions, though in the particular case
of nonobviousness, the higher standard imposed by the Supreme
Court’s 2007 decision in KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc.151 might have
an impact.
Figure 24 confirms our hypothesis that subject matter eligibility
would dominate the CBM procedure. Subject matter eligibility-based
CBM petitions are overwhelmingly instituted, at a rate of 70.9%.152
For all other grounds, decisions not to institute predominate by large
margins: challenges based on novelty were denied at a rate of 59.3%;
nonobviousness, 56.9%; enablement, 100%; written description,
71.7%; and definiteness, 64.7%.153
C.

COURT DECISIONS

While the USPTO evaluates and decides invalidity petitions,
federal courts must decide how to manage ongoing patent
infringement litigation on which these validity challenges can have
considerable impact. The most frequent decision for courts is when
to issue a stay. The ability of defendants to obtain litigation stays
pending the outcome of validity challenges is a powerful strategic
consideration in managing both the immediate cost of litigation and
the eventual threat of liability. Conversely, the tendency of courts to
grant such stays is a powerful strategic consideration for patent
owners to enforce their rights effectively and deflect potential
harassment and abuse by challengers.
Table 1. Results of Motions to Stay Pending Inter Partes Review
Denied in
Denied
part
Fully
without
granted in
Inter Partes Review Denied
prejudice
part
Granted
Motion to Stay Pending
67
47
22
113
Inter Partes Review

151. 550 U.S. 398 (2007).
152. The difference between likelihoods of grant and denial is highly significant
(p < 0.0001 using a two-tailed test of proportions).
153. The differences between likelihoods of grant and denial were all significant
(p < 0.05) and in many cases highly significant (p < 0.005) using a two-tailed test of
proportions.
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Renewed Motion to
Stay Pending Inter
Partes Review
Stipulated/Agreed
Motion to Stay Pending
Inter Partes Review
Sua Sponte Motion to
Stay Pending Inter
Partes Review
Subtotal
Share

2

0

2

11

0

2

2

1

0

0

0

1

69
25.6%

49
18.2%

26
9.63%

126
46.7%

Table 2. Results of Motions to Stay Pending Covered Business Method
Review
Denied in
Denied
part
without
granted in
CBM Review
Denied
prejudice
part
Granted
Motion to Stay Pending
12
7
9
26
CBM Review
Renewed Motion to
Stay Pending CBM
1
0
0
7
Review
Sua Sponte Motion to
Stay Pending CBM
0
0
0
1
Review
Subtotal
13
7
9
34
Share
20.6%
11.1%
14.3%
54.0%

Tables 1 and 2 provide basic statistics regarding motions for stays
pending IPR and CBM proceedings, as well as federal court
adjudications of such motions. As the statistics indicate, full denials
of motions to stay (as contrasted to the combined total of “denials
without prejudice,” partial grants, and grants) are relatively rare,
particularly in the context of CBM reviews.
III.

DISCUSSION

Our analysis yields several “top-line” findings regarding strategic
choices by parties in PTAB proceedings. Most patents challenged at
the PTAB are also in Article III litigation—PTAB petitions on patents
that are not being litigated by any entity in an Article III court are
relatively rare. Moreover, the standard substitution model – wherein
a petitioner files a patent challenge at the PTAB after it has been sued
on that patent in district court is operative not only in the CBM
context but also in the majority (70%) of PTAB IPR cases. The high
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prevalence of standard substitution has clear implications for how
the PTAB should conduct claim construction. In those cases where a
patent claim is upheld by the PTAB, a claim construction standard
that parallels that of the district court would increase efficiency, as
the district court could rely on the PTAB claim construction in any
subsequent proceedings.154 Our findings on substitution are thus
directly relevant to the claim construction dispute currently being
litigated at the Supreme Court in Cuozzo Speed Technologies v. Lee.
If there is no Article III litigation, CCM patents are particularly
unlikely to be challenged at the PTAB. In this area of technology,
district court assertion may be necessary to force parties to overcome
several technology-specific barriers to a petition. These barriers may
include an absence of clarity regarding the merits of a validity
challenge created by lack of boundary notice, as well as informational
hurdles created by the sheer volume of CCM patents.
Just as Article III litigation disproportionately accompanies
PTAB petitions on CCM patents, IPR petitions in the CCM field
appear to be brought largely by the same entities that are defendants
in Article III litigation. Both the share of CCM petitions involving at
least one prior Article III defendant (81.5%) and the share of CCM
petitioners who are themselves prior defendants (76.3%) are quite
high. This result suggests that non-standard petitioners are, at least
thus far, playing a relatively modest role in IPR petitions brought
against CCM patents. Thus, to the extent we see a substantial amount
of serial petitioning in the CCM area, this is being generated by prior
defendants.
The most significant role for non-standard petitioners is in the
Drugs and Medical area. For Drugs and Medical-related challenges,
previously sued defendants make up only a minority of petitioners
(48.5%). Non-standard petitioners also appear to be engaging in
154. Indeed, if the claim construction standards used by the PTAB and the
district court were the same, and the parties involved in the two fora were the same,
the doctrine of issue preclusion might mandate district court reliance upon the
prior PTAB claim construction. In B&B Hardware, Inc. v. Hargis, 135 S.Ct. 1293
(2015), the Supreme Court recently held that issue preclusion applied when the
same parties were litigating in district court a “likelihood of confusion” issue that
had previously been decided at the USPTO’s Trademark Trial and Appeal Board.
Identical claim construction standards could also mean that if the district court
had issued a claim construction prior to the PTAB, the PTAB could rely on the
district court construction. As a practical matter, however, because of the time that
generally elapses before district court claim construction, and because PTAB claim
construction occurs at the time of the institution decision, district court claim
construction is unlikely to precede claim construction by the PTAB.
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significant collective action with standard petitioners. A substantial
majority (70.8%) of petitions in this area contains at least one
petitioner who has previously been sued. Litigation defendants in the
Drugs and Medical field are clearly bringing aboard entities that have
not yet been sued. In order to address policy implications (e.g.,
whether it is socially beneficial collective action or possible
harassment), we are currently investigating the important policy
question of precisely when these other entities are getting on board.
In addition to technology-specific effects, we see district-specific
effects. To a statistically significant degree, patents litigated in the
“top three” district courts—the Eastern District of Texas, the District
of Delaware, and the Northern District of California—are more likely
to be the subject of an IPR than patents litigated in other districts.
The statistically and numerically significant results for the Eastern
District of Texas are unsurprising. Whether or not judges in the
Eastern District grant stays for ongoing litigation (and the available
data suggest defendants are less likely to seek or be granted stays
than in other districts), the Eastern District’s “pro-plaintiff”
reputation makes filing a PTAB petition an obvious choice for any
defendant. In the case of Delaware and the Northern District of
California, the reasons for disproportionately high IPR filings are
less clear. Defendants in those districts may be encouraged, however,
by the high rate of stay grants in these districts.
Agency decision-making also exhibits some interesting patterns.
Perhaps because high early rates of institution spurred petitioners to
challenge somewhat stronger patents, the overall institution rate has
decreased over time. Agency decision-making also exhibits
differential patterns across technology: specifically, IPR institution
rates are significantly higher for CCM patents than for Drug and
Medical patents. Meanwhile, nonobviousness represents a stronger
ground for securing a favorable institution decision on an IPR than
novelty. As for CBM reviews, § 101 is clearly the best route for
challengers.
In current ongoing work, we are investigating both more
intensively and more formally the interrelated questions of collective
action and potential harassment. Specifically, we are investigating
the precise nature and timing of the collective action undertaken
both by petitioners that are prior defendants and those that are not
prior defendants. We are also interested in whether non-defendant
petitioners do in fact become defendants at a later point in time.
Additionally, we are developing regression models that assess,
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conditional on assertion in litigation, what factors influence the
likelihood and frequency of a patent being challenged at the PTAB.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Our data indicate that PTAB petitions on patents that are not
being litigated by any entity in an Article III court are relatively rare,
particularly in the CCM area. Additionally, the “standard model” of
prior district court defendants bringing PTAB petitions on the
patents asserted against them in district court explains 70% of IPR
cases and an even greater percentage of CBM cases.
Given the dominance of prior federal district court litigation
involving the same parties in patents challenged through IPRs and
CBMs, the PTAB’s approach to claim construction should be one
upon which district courts can rely in subsequent proceedings. With
identical standards, district courts will be able to reap significant
efficiency gains from PTAB claim construction decisions.
That said, a significant minority of IPRs are being brought by
entities that were not prior defendants in lawsuits over the patents
that they are now challenging. Non-standard petitioners are
particularly prevalent in the Drugs and Medical area. In ongoing
research, we are examining the precise role of these non-standard
petitioners to examine whether they are engaging in beneficial
collective action or in non-beneficial harassment.
Finally, at least thus far, the relative reluctance of the Eastern
District of Texas to grant stays does not appear to have impeded
entities’ disproportionate desire to seek IPRs for patents asserted in
the Eastern District. Perhaps more surprisingly, patents asserted in
the Northern District of California and in the District of Delaware
also see a disproportionate number of IPR petitions.
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APPENDIX A: DATA
Our analysis can be replicated using data from DocketNavigator,
which provides free and low-cost access to coded metadata about
patent cases in the U.S. federal courts and the USPTO Patent Trial
and Appeal Board.155 In this Appendix, we describe the
DocketNavigator data with the understanding that other researchers
can readily access it to replicate our study.
A.

PTAB DATA

DocketNavigator’s search interface allows minimal queries that
can yield large result sets. Thus, to obtain all case information on all
petitions filed in the PTAB, we used only one search term: “Patent
Trial and Appeal Board (PTAB)” for the “Court/Agency” field.
Because the total number of PTAB cases in the DocketNavigator
database recently passed 4,000 and search results are displayed one
hundred at a time, the results are distributed across forty pages.
Detailed party information about cases is bulk-downloadable on a
page-by-page basis, i.e., each download contains detailed party
information about the cases displayed on the given page of results.
Similarly, detailed information about the patents involved in the
cases is bulk-downloadable on a page-by-page basis as well. Both sets
of case information include multiple variables:
Party Information

Patent Information

Case name

Case name

Court abbreviation

Court abbreviation

Case number

Case number

Case filing date

Case filing date

Party name

Patent

Party roles

Patent title

Firm name

Parties

Attorney name

USPTO class codes
Cooperative patent class
codes

Importantly, case-identifying variables appear in both sets of
downloads, allowing them to be merged. To construct our data set,
we downloaded this detailed party information as well as patent
155. DOCKETNAVIGATOR, http://www.docketnavigator.com [http://perma.cc/
QLY4-LJT7].
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information for all PTAB petitions and merged them by PTAB case
number. The merged results yielded a comprehensive set of filing,
party, and patent information for each IPR and CBM review petition
at the PTAB.
In addition to petition data, DocketNavigator provides searchable
data on PTAB institution decisions. As the earliest PTAB institution
decisions came in December 2012, a date-based search for decisions
issued on or after November 1, 2012 (or any similarly early date),
returns a set of all decisions. As with petition data, these results are
accessible one hundred at a time on a page-by-page basis. To this
end, the “Print Friendly” feature in the search result interface
generates a simple formatted table to copy directly into spreadsheet
software. The institution decision data contain the following
variables:
Institution Decision Information
Patent number
Case name
Case number
Substantive ground for petition
Institution decision on that ground
Relevant patent claims to which the decision pertains
Order filing date

Finally, DocketNavigator provides searchable data on final
determinations by the PTAB. Searching for “Patent Trial and Appeal
Board (PTAB)” in the “Court/Agency” field returns a set of all
determinations. These results, too, are accessible one hundred at a
time on a page-by-page basis and available in a simple formatted
table through the “Print Friendly” feature in the search result
interface. The final determinations data contain the following
variables:
Final Determination Information
Patent number
Case name
Case filing date
Determination
Judge
Order filing date
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Because this institution decision data and final determination
data also contain case-identifying variables that overlap with the
filing, party, and patent data, we readily merged this additional
information into our data set as well.
B.

DISTRICT COURT DATA

We obtained case information on patent litigations filed in the
U.S. district courts with a similarly minimal search query in
DocketNavigator’s primary search interface: “U.S. District Courts
(and all districts)” for the “Court/Agency” field. The total number of
patent cases in the DocketNavigator database exceeded 55,000
results. Because IPR petitions are generally time-barred one year
from the date when a would-be petitioner has been sued on the same
patent in U.S. district court,156 we determined that a reasonably
complete set of federal patent litigation would not need to extend
more than one year before the IPR mechanism became available.
Therefore, we narrowed our search to cases, other than declaratory
judgment cases, filed on or after September 16, 2011, one year prior
to the enactment of IPR and CBM review mechanisms in the PTAB.
As with PTAB cases, detailed party and patent information about
U.S. district court patent cases is bulk-downloadable on a page-bypage basis. Both sets of case information include multiple variables:
Party Information

Patent Information

Case name

Case name

Court abbreviation

Court abbreviation

Case number

Case number

Case filing date

Case filing date

Party name

Patent

Party roles

Patent title

Firm name

Parties

Attorney name

USPTO class codes
Cooperative patent class codes

To construct our data set, we downloaded this detailed party and
patent information for all relevant patent lawsuits and merged them
on the case number, producing a comprehensive set of filing, party,
and patent information on each patent lawsuit in the U.S. district
courts.
156. 35 U.S.C. § 315(b).
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APPENDIX B: FIGURES
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Figure 2: IPR Petition Filings Across Technology
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Figure 3: Cumulative IPR Petition Filings Across Technology
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Figure 4: Proportions of IPR Petitions Containing Each Grounds
for Challenge, Across Technology Area
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Figure 6: CBM Petition Filings Across Technology
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Figure 8: Share of IPR-Challenged Patents in Each Technology Area
That Were the Subject of Multiple Petitions
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Figure 10: Patent Case Filings by Month
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Figure 11: Cumulative Patent Case Filings Across Technology
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Figure 13: Technology Proportions Among PTAB-Only, Federal
Court-Only, and PTAB-and-Federal Court Patents
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Figure 14a: Share of CBM Petitioners That Were Defendants in a
Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Figure 14b: Share of CBM Petitions in Which At Least One Petitioner
Was a
Defendant in a Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Figure 15a: Share of IPR Petitioners That Were Defendants in a
Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Was a
Defendant in a Prior Suit on the Same Patent, by Technology
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Figure 16: District-Specific Effects
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Figure 17: Distribution of Lag Between First IPR Petition and First
Federal Court Litigation, in Years
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Figure 18: Distribution of Lag Between First IPR Petition and Last
Federal Court Filing Prior to Petition, in Years
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Figure 19: IPR Filings, Institution Decisions, and Institution
Decisions Granting At Least One Challenged Claim
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Figure 21: Rate of At-Least-Partial Institution and Full Institution of
IPR Petitions over Time, By Month
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Figure 22: Institutions of IPR Petitions Based on Novelty, by
Technology
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Figure 23: IPR Institutions of Petitions Based on Nonobviousness, by
Technology
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Figure 24: CBM Institutions of Petitions, by Grounds
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APPENDIX C: TABLES

Table 1: Inter Partes petitions filed by Intel in the Zond cases
Petition For

IPR Number

Filing Date

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00443

Feb. 20, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00444

Feb. 20, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00445

Feb. 20, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00446

Feb. 20, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00447

Feb. 20, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00455

Feb. 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00456

Feb. 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00468

Feb. 28, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00470

Mar. 7, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00473

Mar. 7, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00494

Mar. 13, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00495

Mar. 13, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00496

Mar. 13, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00497

Mar. 13, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00498

Mar. 13, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00520

Mar. 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00521

Mar. 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00522

Mar. 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00523

Mar. 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00598

Apr. 9, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00686

Apr. 24, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00765

May 16, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00820

May 27, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00843

May 29, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00913

Jun 6, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00923

Jun 10, 2014

Intel Corporation

IPR2014-00945

Jun 12, 2014
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Table 2: Inter Partes Review Petitions filed by Defendants in Zond
cases
Petition For

IPR Number

Filing Date

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

IPR2014-01037

June 30, 2014

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

IPR2014-01075

June 30, 2014

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

IPR2014-01071

June 30, 2014

Advanced Micro Devices, Inc.

IPR2014-01069

June 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Limited

IPR2014-00848

May 29, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00850

May 29, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00844

May 29, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00846

May 29, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00845

May 29, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00849

May 29, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00855

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00866

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00851

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00865

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00856

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00859

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00858

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00863

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00864

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00867

May 30, 2014

Fujitsu Semiconductor Ltd.

IPR2014-00918

June 09, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01042

June 27, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01059

June 27, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01047

June 27, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01083

June 30, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01086

June 30, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01076

June 30, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01061

June 30, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01087

June 30, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01073

June 30, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01088

July 01, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01098

July 01, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01099

July 01, 2014

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01089

July 01, 2014
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Petition For

IPR Number

Filing Date

GlobalFoundries U.S., Inc.

IPR2014-01100

July 01, 2014

Renesas Electronics Corp.

IPR2014-01057

June 27, 2014

Renesas Electronics Corp.

IPR2014-01046

June 27, 2014

Renesas Electronics Corp.

IPR2014-01066

June 30, 2014

Renesas Electronics Corp.

IPR2014-01063

June 30, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00805

May 23, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00782

May 19, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00781

May 19, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00800

May 22, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00799

May 22, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00803

May 22, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00802

May 22, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00807

May 23, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00808

May 23, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00819

May 27, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00821

May 27, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00818

May 27, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00828

May 28, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00829

May 28, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00827

May 28, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00861

May 30, 2014

Taiwan Semiconductor Mfg. Co.

IPR2014-00917

June 09, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00479

Mar. 4, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00477

Mar. 4, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00974

June 18, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00975

June 18, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00972

June 18, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00973

June 18, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00992

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00986

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00981

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00991

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00984

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00990

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00988

June 19, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00985

June 19, 2014
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Petition For

IPR Number

Filing Date

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01003

June 20, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00996

June 20, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01000

June 20, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-00995

June 20, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01004

June 20, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01012

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01017

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01016

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01015

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01019

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01014

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01013

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01020

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01022

June 23, 2014

The Gillette Co.

IPR2014-01025

June 23, 2014

Toshiba Corp.

IPR2014-01072

June 30, 2014

Toshiba Corp.

IPR2014-01070

June 23, 2014

Toshiba Corp.

IPR2014-01067

June 23, 2014

Toshiba Corp.

IPR2014-01074

June 23, 2014

Toshiba Corp.

IPR2014-01065

June 23, 2014

Table 3: Inter Partes Review Petitions filed by Defedants in E-Watch
v. LG Electronics
Petition For

IPR Number

Filing Date

HTC Corp.

IPR2014-00987

June 19, 2014

Sony Mobile Comm. (USA) Inc.

IPR2015-00402

Dec. 10, 2014

LG Electronics, Inc.

IPR2015-00404

Dec. 10, 2014

Kyocera Communications, Inc.

IPR2015-00406

Dec. 10, 2014

Apple Inc.

IPR2015-00411

Dec. 11, 2014

Apple Inc.

IPR2015-00412

Dec. 11, 2014

Apple Inc.

IPR2015-00413

Dec. 11, 2014

Samsung Electronics Co.

IPR2015-00541

Jan. 7, 2015

Samsung Electronics Co.

IPR2015-00610

Jan. 23, 2015

Samsung Electronics Co.

IPR2015-00612

Jan. 23, 2015

ZTE (USA) Inc.

IPR2015-01366

June 09, 2015
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